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Understanding human cooperation is a major scientific challenge. While cooperation is typi-
cally explained with reference to individual preferences, a recent cognitive process view
hypothesized that cooperation is regulated by socially acquired heuristics. Evidence for the
social heuristics hypothesis rests on experiments showing that time-pressure promotes
cooperation, a result that can be interpreted as demonstrating that intuition promotes coop-
eration. This interpretation, however, is highly contested because of two potential con-
founds. First, in pivotal studies compliance with time-limits is low and, crucially, evidence
shows intuitive cooperation only when noncompliant participants are excluded. The incon-
sistency of test results has led to the currently unresolved controversy regarding whether or
not noncompliant subjects should be included in the analysis. Second, many studies show
high levels of social dilemma misunderstanding, leading to speculation that asymmetries in
understanding might explain patterns that are otherwise interpreted as intuitive cooperation.
We present evidence from an experiment that employs an improved time-pressure protocol
with new features designed to induce high levels of compliance and clear tests of under-
standing. Our study resolves the noncompliance issue, shows that misunderstanding does
not confound tests of intuitive cooperation, and provides the first independent experimental
evidence for intuitive cooperation in a social dilemma using time-pressure.
Introduction
The emergence and expansion of cooperation is vital for the success of human civilisations.
Early humans beat evolutionary odds, in part, by forming small groups to hunt, gather and
share large mammals in the African savanna. Since then, human cooperation has evolved to
support global networks of communication, production and trade [1–2]. In examples such as
these where cooperation is often mutually beneficial, the tendency to cooperate is often
explained via mechanisms grounded in self-interest, such as those invoking “weak reciprocity”
[3–6] or fitness enhancing behaviour at the kin, group or spatial levels [7–11].
Behavioural experiments over the past fifty years, however, show that human cooperation
can also be altruistic. For example, in social dilemma games involving anonymous and non-
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repeated interactions, where cooperation is neither individually beneficial nor fitness enhanc-
ing, humans across the globe exhibit significant cooperative tendencies, including a willingness
to punish defectors at personal cost to themselves [1, 11–19]. Such findings have motivated a
rethinking of the theoretical foundations of cooperative behaviour; in particular, it has led to
an emphasis on the concept of “strong reciprocity”, understood as an evolutionarily acquired
preference for cooperation, and now widely viewed as an important ingredient in explaining
cooperation [1, 20–21]. However, this conception of cooperation as altruistic preference was
recently challenged by the social heuristics hypothesis [11, 22–25] that grounds the study of
cooperation in contemporary cognitive process models.
The social heuristics hypothesis draws on the well-established dual-process perspective
which posits that individual decisions emerge from an interplay of two systems of thinking: A
fast and frugal system that relies on heuristics and affective responses versus a slow and effort-
ful system that relies on deliberative decision-making [26–27]. It also draws on the concept of
ecological rationality, which highlights the adaptive fit between the human mind and the envi-
ronment [28–30]. In particular, proponents of the social heuristics hypothesis claim that intui-
tive decisions reflect heuristics acquired in the course of everyday social interactions about
whether or not to cooperate. Accordingly, people who have regularly benefited from coopera-
tion in the past will tend to automatically cooperate in future social dilemmas when acting on
intuition. However, they will be less cooperative the more they reflect on the current situation, as
reflection enhances the salience of private costs of cooperation. In contrast, people who have
not acquired such heuristics will not exhibit intuitive cooperation. Thus, a novel prediction is
that any mixed population would tend to exhibit intuitive cooperation, and that the strength of
this tendency would depend on the proportions of the types in the population [22–25].
This characterisation of cooperation as a psychologically-grounded social heuristic, if cor-
rect, has profound theoretical and practical implications across multiple disciplines including
Anthropology, Biology, Economics and Psychology. The social heuristics hypothesis and its
prediction of intuitive cooperation challenge not simply a more conventional view of agents as
instinctively selfish [31–32] but also the more basic characterization of patterns in human
cooperation as reflecting some distribution of stable and consistent prosocial attitudes [20–
21]; instead, it interprets cooperation as reflecting short-cuts adapted to and norms imported
from natural ecologies [23, 33–34]. Moreover, if cooperation is context-dependent then it has
the potential to be manipulated–a possibility with significant policy implications. For example,
policies to ‘train intuition’ in local social interactions in ways that promote intuitive coopera-
tion may help sustain cooperation in the management of global problems such as climate
change [35]. Cooperative intuitions may also be open to exploitation and hence regulation
may be warranted to prevent such abuse.
Given the wide relevance of the social heuristics hypothesis, the last five years has seen a
concerted effort to test the prediction of intuitive cooperation, culminating in a meta-analysis
[36] and a replication project involving twenty-one labs [37]. However, two major unresolved
issues have so far prevented a reliable interpretation of the accumulated data as supporting the
social heuristics hypothesis. In this study, we resolve both issues and consequently provide the
first strong and independent evidence for intuitive cooperation.
These unresolved issues, as we now explain, are endemic to experimental data generated via
what has become a standard cognitive process manipulation protocol originally developed by
Rand, Greene and Nowak for testing the social heuristics hypothesis [22]. Studies using this
protocol observe behaviour in a social dilemma such as a public good game, and compare deci-
sions made under time-pressure (via prompts to decide “quickly” and “in less than 10 seconds”)
with those made following forced-delay (via prompts to think “carefully” and “for at least 10
seconds”). The time-pressure manipulation is intended to increase reliance on intuition by
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cutting reflective cognitive processes short. To the extent that implementations of this protocol
do promote reliance on intuition, then in the absence of other confounding factors, signifi-
cantly higher contributions to the public good under time-pressure compared to forced-delay
may be interpreted as evidence for intuitive cooperation. However, this interpretation is seri-
ously contested because of two potential confounds.
First and foremost, despite attempts at improvement, noncompliance with time-limits
remains very high among time-pressured participants. In Study 6 of Rand et al [22], which
introduced the protocol that we develop further in our study, 48% of time-pressured partici-
pants were noncompliant (i.e., responded after the 10 second limit). To remedy this, some sub-
sequent studies have displayed timers on the decision screens to help participants keep track of
time. Despite initial evidence from smaller-scale studies that visible timers may increase com-
pliance [23, 38, 39], a majority (65.9%) of time-pressured participants remained noncompliant
in the recent large-scale multi-lab replication project of Bouwmeester et al [37], calling into
question the consistency of visible timers in achieving high rates of compliance. Currently,
there is sharp disagreement in the literature about whether noncompliant participants should
be excluded from the analysis. Critics of exclusion [37, 40] argue that excluding a large number
of noncompliant participants voids causal identification of treatment effects (e.g., because slow
responders have been shown, in response-time studies, to be less cooperative, exclusion may
artificially inflate intuitive cooperation); in contrast, proponents justify exclusion by arguing
that inclusion may dilute the true causal effect of intuition because noncompliant participants
may have been unsuccessfully treated with the time-limit manipulations [41]. This issue is cru-
cial because individual time-limit manipulation studies reported in the original article by Rand
et al [22] as well as the large-scale meta-analysis of Rand [36] and the multi-lab replication
project of Bouwmeester et al [37] provide evidence for the “intuitive cooperation” hypothesis
only when noncompliant participants are excluded. We present a large-scale study that over-
comes this problem by familiarizing participants with the user interface (i.e., a novel slider tool
used for registering responses) and by incentivising compliance with time-limits, and in doing
so consistently achieves comparably high levels of compliance across time-manipulation
conditions.
The second unresolved issue is whether participants’ misunderstanding of the social
dilemma situation (e.g., the public good game) confounds testing of the intuitive cooperation
hypothesis. Evidence from the literature points to high levels of participant misunderstanding:
Based on two questions posed after the contribution decisions have been made, 45.6% of par-
ticipants in Rand et al’s [22] Study 6 and 35.9% of participants in the multi-lab replication
project [37] failed to understand the public good game as a social dilemma (i.e., misconceived
either the self-gain maximizing strategy, the group-gain maximizing strategy or both). It is
potentially more problematic, however, if misunderstanding were particularly severe for time-
pressured participants. There is some concern in the literature that this may be the case because,
unlike time-pressured participants, those in the forced-delay condition have the opportunity to
consolidate their understanding while deciding upon the contribution to the public good [42].
Such an asymmetric distribution of understanding across the time-limit conditions may con-
found tests of intuitive cooperation if misunderstanding leads participants to deviate from their
own payoff maximization by mistake. However, the Rand et al protocol [22] may not provide a
sound basis for testing whether there are asymmetries in understanding across time manipula-
tion conditions because questions of understanding in this protocol are themselves not time-
manipulated. Unlimited time for answering understanding questions may allow those partici-
pants who made contribution decisions under time-pressure to reflect on the task and in doing
so to “catch-up” with forced-delayed participants in their understanding of the social dilemma
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situation; this may lead to an overestimation of participants’ understanding at the point in time
when they made their contribution decisions.
Our study addresses the issue of understanding in two ways: First, it provides a novel
method to correct for possible mismeasurement of asymmetries in understanding in the Rand
et al protocol [22]. By randomly assigning time-limits to questions of understanding, we cap-
ture their direct effects on measures of understanding and test for asymmetries in understand-
ing. Second, we compare understanding in the widely-used instructions of Rand et al (our
Short instructions condition) to two pedagogically motivated instructional “supplements”
(Long and Tool instructions conditions). While Short provides a test of the intuitive coopera-
tion hypothesis in a manner comparable to the current literature [22, 37], Long mimics the
more analytical, abstract and elaborated style of public good game instructions widely used by
experimental and behavioural economists [43]; comparison of understanding in Short vs. Long
is intended to check whether the comparatively brief instructions used in the recent literature
on intuitive cooperation cause any unique problems of comprehension. In this comparison,
researchers who rely on Long instructions may expect Short instructions to diminish under-
standing and to increase data noise [44], whereas users of Short instructions may expect Long
to weaken time-pressure manipulation’s ability to induce intuition [22]. To address these con-
trasting expectations in the literature regarding Short and Long, we designed the Tool condi-
tion, our exploratory attempt to enable inducement of intuitive thinking via time-pressure
(as expected with Short), while achieving high level of understanding (as expected with Long).
Hence, we hypothesize that both Short and Tool instruction conditions would exhibit intuitive
cooperation but that the Long conditions would not do so.
To summarize, our study is designed to resolve the noncompliance issue, to check for prob-
lems of understanding and thereby to provide improved tests of the hypothesis of intuitive
cooperation. Various studies since Rand et al [22, 45], in particular those that successfully used
visible timers [23, 38, 39], have simultaneously achieved high compliance and found evidence
of intuitive cooperation. Nevertheless, according to the meta-analysis by Rand [36], of the 27
studies that tested the effects of time-manipulations in social dilemmas, 12 were conducted by
unaffiliated groups; none of these independent studies show positive effect of time-pressure on
cooperation. In an era where the “gold standard for reliability is independent replication” [46],
these results have not yet been replicated by scholars unaffiliated with the original Rand et al
[22] group. To the best of our knowledge, our study provides the first independent evidence of
intuitive cooperation in a social dilemma using time-pressure.
Materials and methods
Overview
We modified the online experimental protocol reported in Study 6 of Rand et al [22] to pro-
vide enhanced evaluations of intuitive cooperation and possible asymmetries in understand-
ing. The experiment involved a 3 (Instructions) x 2 (Cooperation decision time) x 2 (Test
question decision time) between-subjects design. Having received one of three different sets of
instructions (the original short instructions of Study 6 in Rand et al or one of two instructional
supplements that include either a long analytical description of the task or an interactive learn-
ing tool) participants made contribution decisions in a one-shot linear public good game either
under time-pressure or forced-delay; then they answered seven questions about the public
good game, either under time-pressure or forced-delay; finally, participants completed a sur-
vey involving measures of affective states, cognitive thinking styles and numeracy. The survey
questions are peripheral to the main goals of this article and they are discussed in Supporting
Information.
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Participants
We use data from 935 participants, restricting our sample to native English speaking U.K. resi-
dents who were 18 years or older, and excluding 52 participants who failed to complete the
study. Ethics approval was obtained from University of Nottingham School of Economics
Research Ethics Committee, and written informed consent was obtained online from each par-
ticipant at the beginning of the study. Online recruitment provided us access to a participant
pool that is more representative of the general U.K. population than would be possible with
laboratory experiments using university students (e.g., our sample included 24% students and
45% who were 35 years or older). Experience with the public good game has been shown to
weaken intuitive cooperation [23]. We thus recruited participants via Academic Prolific, whose
participant pool has been shown to be less experienced compared to alternatives such as Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk [47]. As expected, our sample reported low levels of experience with pub-
lic good experiments (14% of our participants). The sample size was chosen to achieve
statistical power of 80% to detect effect sizes comparable to Study 6 in Rand et al [22]. Includ-
ing a participation payment of £0.50, participants earned £1.72 on average for a study with a
mean completion time of 13 minutes.
Procedure
Slider training. Contributions to the public good and answers to the understanding ques-
tions were elicited via a slider tool. We modified the slider technology used in Rand et al [22]
to address two potential problems. First, the slider used by Rand et al has a default position in
the middle, which may have an anchoring effect on participants’ responses. Instead, our selec-
tion tool began with an empty bar with only the minimum and maximum values of the choice
set visible; the slider appears only when the empty bar is clicked, and it displays the currently
chosen value, which dynamically updates as the slider is moved along the bar. Second, partici-
pants in the time-manipulation studies of Rand et al [22] encounter the slider for the first time
when asked to submit their contribution decisions. Forced-delay participants have time to
familiarise themselves with how the slider works whereas time-pressured participants do not,
and this difference may affect participants’ responses including their compliance with time-
limits. To minimize differences in familiarity with the slider and increase compliance, partici-
pants in our study completed, prior to seeing the public good game instructions, a slider train-
ing screen that explained how the slider worked and then asked them to submit and verify at
least one numerical value of their own choosing.
Public good game. We followed the experimental procedure of Study 6 of Rand et al [22],
using a one-shot linear public good game with four-person groups, individual endowment of
40 pence and “marginal per capita return” of 0.5 (i.e., net individual return on units contrib-
uted to the public good). After reading instructions first on the public good game and then on
the monetary consequences of noncompliance with the time limits, individuals were asked to
use the slider tool to privately choose how much of their endowment to contribute to a “com-
mon project” (i.e., the public good) and how much to “keep for self”. Each penny contributed
to the public good leads to a net individual loss of half a penny, while increasing total group
earnings by two pennies. In terms of monetary earnings, maximisation of self-gain is achieved
by keeping all the endowment, whereas group-gain maximization requires all endowments to
be contributed to the public good. This constitutes a social dilemma from the individual’s per-
spective because self-gain and group-gain maximization cannot simultaneously be achieved.
Test of understanding. Having made their contribution decisions, participants were
asked seven questions about the task they had just completed, with each correct answer earn-
ing them an additional 20 pence. Six of the questions assessed understanding of various aspects
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of the public good game, whereas one question elicited beliefs regarding other group members’
average contributions. Questions were presented on separate screens, and were of comparable
length (ranging from 13 to 16 words).
The first two questions, presented in random order, jointly measure “social dilemma under-
standing”: QSelf asks for the individual level of contribution necessary for maximizing own
monetary payoff (the correct answer is no contribution) and QGroup asks for the individual
level of contribution necessary for maximizing monetary earnings for the whole group (the
correct answer is full contribution). Following the convention in the literature [22], we catego-
rize a participant as having understood that the public good game is a social dilemma if both
answers are correct. The five subsequent questions were exploratory and analyses of these are
presented in Supporting Information.
Manipulations
Time-pressure vs. forced-delay. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of two
time-limit conditions (time-pressure or forced-delay) twice, once for the public good contribu-
tion decision and then for answering the understanding questions. Based on the Rand et al
[22] protocol, the instructions prompted participants to “decide quickly and choose within
ten seconds” in the time-pressure condition, or to “carefully think for at least ten seconds”
in the forced-delay condition. The former instructions are intended to reduce opportunities
for reflective thinking thereby inducing greater reliance on intuitive processes; the latter are
intended to encourage greater reliance on reflective processes.
We modified the time-manipulation protocol of Rand et al [22] to address the problems
of noncompliance to time limits and potentialmismeasurement of asymmetric understanding
discussed in the Introduction. We addressed noncompliance by imposing pecuniary conse-
quences for responses that lay outside the prescribed time; participants were told that noncom-
pliant responses would be ineligible for any additional earnings from the upcoming task. This
information was conveyed to participants twice—prior to the contribution decision screen,
and prior to the questions evaluating understanding. In each case, the information was pre-
sented on a separate screen for a fixed period (15 seconds and 20 seconds respectively), inter-
vals that were long enough for participants to clearly read the text but short enough to deny
the opportunity to reflect on the upcoming task. To check whether misunderstanding is a con-
found we provided an independent measure of the effect of time-limits on understanding by
randomly assigning participants to the time-pressure and forced-delay conditions for under-
standing questions; hence, any spill-over effects of the contributions task were likely to be
balanced across the time-pressure and forced-delay conditions of the understanding task.
We thus observe the independent effects of the time-limit manipulations on questions of
understanding.
Public good game instructions. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of three
different public good game instruction conditions (instructions are available in Supporting
Information). For Short, our benchmark instructions for testing intuitive cooperation, we
adopted the instructions of Study 6 in Rand et al [22] with minor modifications. To identify
problems of understanding unique to Short, we devised two further sets of instructions, Long
and Tool. These begin with the same text as Short, then the two examples at the end of Short
are replaced by one or other of the two instructional supplements. Long mimics salient features
of public good game instructions widely-used in Experimental Economics, originally designed
to achieve high levels of understanding in the laboratory [15, 43]. Compared to Short, Long is
not only longer (202 vs. 730 words) but is also more analytical and abstract in style, explaining
the relationship between contributions and earnings via mathematical functions and examples
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involving numerical calculations. It is as an open question whether Long would improve
understanding; either way Long may not be ideal for testing for intuitive cooperation as its ana-
lytical style may induce “reflective thinking” among all participants, thereby weakening the
capacity of time-pressure manipulation to induce intuitive thinking [22, 40]. Tool, our third
set of instructions, is a novel attempt to enhance understanding via self-guided experiential
learning; it provides participants with an onscreen “calculator” with two inputs (own contribu-
tion level and others’ average contribution level) and simultaneously display two outputs (own
earnings and others’ average earnings). Using this tool, participants are asked to verify for
themselves two examples and encouraged to explore further the determination of earnings
from the public good game on their own. Unlike the Long instructions, Tool conceals the func-
tional determination of and any numerical calculations pertaining to the earnings from the
public good behind the “black-box” of a calculator. We expected that, relative to Long, Tool
would be less likely to induce reflective thinking; we also expected it to enhance understanding
relative to Short. As such, the Tool condition is an exploratory attempt to provide an alternative
to Short for testing intuitive cooperation.
Results
We begin by reporting manipulation checks and data on compliance with time limits and then
present our findings on intuitive cooperation and understanding. In order to provide compa-
rability with previous research, our analysis and statistical methods follow those reported in
the original work of Rand et al [22]; likewise, we report only two-tailed statistical tests through-
out the article.
Manipulation checks
Following the procedure adopted by previous research, we use the effects of time-limit
prompts on response times as manipulation checks [48]. The average time taken to make con-
tribution decisions across all three instruction conditions was 6.9 seconds with 95% confidence
interval of [6.6, 7.1] for the time-pressure group and 32.9 seconds [29.9, 35.8] for the forced-
delay group (n = 935; t-test on log10 of response time: P< 0.001). Similarly for understanding
questions, time-pressured participants across all instructional variations spent 9.9 seconds
[9.6, 10.3] on average per question, compared to 28.5 seconds [27.0, 29.9] by those under
forced-delay. Thus, time-manipulation of the understanding questions motivated participants
to regulate their response duration in the intended directions (n = 935; t-test on log10 of
response time: P< 0.001). In short, the time-limit manipulations induced behaviourally dis-
tinct treatment groups as intended.
Compliance with time limits
As illustrated in Fig 1, our modified protocol achieved high compliance in both time-limit con-
ditions of the public good game consistently across all instructional variations. The four mono-
chrome bars in the figure represent the time-limit compliance rates found in Study 6 of Rand
et al [22] and Bouwmeester et al [37], showing significantly lower compliance under time-
pressure as compared with forced-delay. The six blue bars represent our study, showing com-
pliance rates that ranged from 88.2% to 96.1%. Overall, compliance in our study was 90.0
[86.9, 92.5] in time-pressure vs. 92.7% [90.0, 94.9] in forced-delay conditions of the public
good game, a statistically insignificant difference (n = 935; χ2 test: P = 0.139). Thus, our modi-
fied time-manipulation protocol resolved the crucial issue of low and asymmetric compliance
rates for the public good game and improved the likelihood of correspondence between alter-
native tests of intuitive cooperation (i.e., inclusion vs. exclusion of noncompliant participants).
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Compliance to time-limits imposed on the two understanding questions varied consider-
ably: Compliance was 78.3% [74.3, 82.0] in time-pressure vs. 83.7% [80.1, 87.0] in forced-delay
conditions for QGroup (χ2 test: P = 0.033), and was 61.6% [57.0, 66.0] in time-pressure vs. 88.1%
[84.8, 90.9] in forced-delay conditions for QSelf (n = 935; χ2 test: P< 0.001). Given that the
same sample of participants was largely compliant when making contributions to the public
good, the difference in compliance rates under time-pressure between QGroup and QSelf proba-
bly reflects a previously unnoticed difference in the difficulty of answering QSelf relative to
QGroup. We present more evidence supporting this novel finding in Supporting Information as
it does not pertain to this study’s primary motivation.
Intuitive cooperation
Fig 2 depicts treatment effect sizes as percentage point differences in contributions between
the time-pressure and forced-delay conditions. The four monochrome lines at the top
Fig 1. Time-limit compliance rates for forced-delay and time-pressure conditions. Error bars denote
95% confidence intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190560.g001
Fig 2. Time-pressure minus forced-delay percentage point difference in contributions. Circles denote
average contributions. Filled circles (●) include and empty circles () exclude noncompliant participants. Lines
crossing the circles denote 95% confidence intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190560.g002
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summarize the findings of Study 6 in Rand et al [22] and the multi-lab replication project of
Bouwmeester et al [37], where the lack of overlap between the two confidence intervals within
each study demonstrates that alternative analyses of the data (i.e., inclusion vs. exclusion of
noncompliant participants) provide incongruent results for studies with low rates of compli-
ance. The six blue lines at the bottom represent our study. Notice that, for each instructional
variation in our study (i.e., Short, Long and Tool), very similar confidence intervals emerge
regardless of whether noncompliant participants are included or excluded from the analysis.
We now test for evidence of intuitive cooperation focusing first on Short, our attempt to
replicate Study 6 in Rand et al [22]. Using all observations in Short, including participants who
did not comply with the time-limits, we find a difference of 7.44 [-0.22, 15.10] percentage
points between time-pressure and forced-delay conditions. This positive effect of time-pres-
sure on cooperation is statistically significant (n = 314; ranksum, P = 0.025). As expected from
the high and symmetric levels of compliance to time-limits in our public good game, these
results also hold when we exclude noncompliant participants from the analysis: In this case,
the difference between the two conditions is 7.12 [-0.77, 15.02] percentage points, and the pos-
itive effect of time-pressure on contributions to the public good remains statistically significant
(n = 286; ranksum, P = 0.039). We thus provide the first independent evidence of intuitive
cooperation using a time-manipulation protocol that is free from complications of
noncompliance.
As previously discussed, the analytical style of Long may weaken the inducement of intui-
tion. In line with this expectation, the percentage point difference in contributions between all
time-pressured and forced-delay participants in Long is -0.49 [-7.93, 6.95], which is not statisti-
cally distinguishable from zero (n = 308; ranksum, P = 0.741). The Tool, on the other hand,
was expected to exhibit intuitive cooperation by minimizing overall inducement of reflective
thinking while enhancing understanding as compared with Short. Although the difference in
contributions between the two time-limit conditions is not statistically significant (n = 313;
ranksum, P = 0.380), contributions in Tool among all participants under time-pressure are
nevertheless 4.75 [-2.81, 12.32] percentage points higher than those under forced-delay. The
fact that the bulk of the 95% confidence intervals for Tool lay to the right of zero is consistent
with the interpretation that Tool exhibits intuitive cooperation and that our study was under-
powered to detect its smaller effect. Finally, we pool together all observations from Short and
Tool, the two instruction conditions expected to exhibit intuitive cooperation; we observe that
contributions are 6.09 [0.70, 11.48] percentage points higher under time-pressure than under
forced-delay and we find this effect to be statistically significant (n = 627; ranksum, P = 0.033).
Understanding of the social dilemma
We first estimate the extent of social dilemma misconception in Short and compare it to
the two instructional supplements. As described in the Methods section, we measure social
dilemma understanding (i.e., conception of the public good game as a social dilemma) with a
variable that equals 1 if both test questions that constitute the social dilemma (QSelf & QGroup)
are answered correctly, and zero otherwise. Only 43.3% [37.8, 49.0] of participants in the Short
instructions condition exhibited correct social dilemma understanding, raising the question
whether similarly high levels of misunderstanding observed in the literature are due to the
briefness of the instructions provided by Rand et al [22]. Surprisingly, despite extended analyt-
ical descriptions and numerical examples, social dilemma understanding in Long (31.8% [26.7,
37.3]) was 11.5 percentage points lower than Short (n = 622; χ2 test: P = 0.003). Comparing
Short to Long, the high levels of misunderstanding found in the literature do not seem to stem
from the briefness of instructions used; in contrast, the analytical, abstract and elaborated
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instructional tradition of Economics leads to poorer comprehension, at least in our online
environment. On the other hand, understanding in Tool (51.4% [45.8, 57.1]) was 8.1 percent-
age points higher than Short (n = 627; χ2 test: P = 0.042). Comparing Short to Tool, we see that
enhanced opportunities for learning via self-guided examples are effective in improving
understanding of the decision problem as a social dilemma.
Despite these high levels of misunderstanding and in line with findings in the literature, we
do not find the public good game contributions to depend on social dilemma understanding
either in Short, Long or Tool conditions (Ranksum: P> 0.250 for each condition). To provide
a more precise test whether misunderstanding may be confounding our finding of intuitive
cooperation, we now check for asymmetries in understanding across the time-limit manipula-
tions of the understanding questions. Fig 3 depicts rates of social dilemma understanding for
each instructional variation based on whether the questions were answered under time-pres-
sure or forced-delay. Even with the enhanced measure of asymmetries, we observe no statisti-
cal difference in social dilemma understanding between time-pressured and forced-delayed
test question groups for Short, Long or Tool conditions (χ2 test: P = 0.820 for Short; P = 0.463
for Long; P = 0.128 for Tool). Hence, our study finds no support for the suggestion that mea-
sures of understanding in the literature are biased by asymmetries between the time-pressure
and forced-delay conditions.
Finally, as summarized in Table 1, we ran a set of tobit regressions with model specifications
similar to Study 6 of Rand et al [22], and replicate their finding that intuitive cooperation con-
tinues to hold when controlling for understanding (R1 vs. R2). As an additional analysis, we
consider the interaction between understanding and time-limit conditions applied during the
contribution decisions, and find that the effect of intuitive cooperation exists only for those who
have the correct social dilemma understanding (R3). This finding is in line with the empirical
results of Strømland, Tjøtta & Torsvik [42] as well as with the predictions of the evolutionary
game theoretic model of Bear & Rand [24], where reflection diminishes cooperation only if peo-
ple are aware that the decision context is a social dilemma. This latter result indicates that the
presence of a large percentage of participants with misconceptions may undermine the effect
size of intuitive cooperation. Overall, these results suggest that misunderstanding does not con-
found our finding of intuitive cooperation in Short.
Fig 3. Rates of social dilemma understanding for forced-delay and time-pressure conditions imposed
on the understanding questions. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190560.g003
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Discussion
The social heuristics hypothesis predicts a tendency for intuition to be cooperative. However,
two potential confounds have until now inhibited a clear interpretation of the accumulated
evidence. The goal of this study was to eliminate these confounds and thereby to conduct
stronger tests of the prediction of intuitive cooperation. Our modified experimental protocol
succeeded in achieving this goal, and concurrently provided the first independent replication
of the phenomenon of intuitive cooperation in a social dilemma using time-pressure.
Our resolution of the issues of compliance and understanding relied on modifications to
the original protocol. To increase compliance, we allowed familiarization with the user inter-
face and introduced pecuniary incentives; high rates of compliance across the treatment condi-
tions generated congruent tests of the hypothesis of intuitive cooperation and hence avoided
the polarising issue of whether to exclude noncompliant participants from the analysis. To
check whether misunderstanding confounds these hypothesis tests, we introduced time-limits
on understanding questions, and we compared the relatively brief instructions used in the
original protocol with pedagogical alternatives; we found no evidence for confounds.
Overall, our findings allow us to view competing interpretations of the research on intuitive
cooperation in new light. In particular, three pivotal studies in the literature provide evidence
for the intuitive cooperation hypothesis only when noncompliant participants are excluded
[22, 36, 37]. While Bouwmeester et al [37] argue that exclusion may bias the results because
slow responders are found to be less cooperative, Rand [41] justifies exclusion by arguing that
noncompliance may indicate a failure to induce intuitive thinking. Our successful minimiza-
tion of noncompliance, combined with our finding of intuitive cooperation, not only supports
Rand’s claim that noncompliance to time-limits may indicate manipulation failure but also
redeems time-pressure as a viable method for inducing intuition. In sum, our study avoids the
key problems of misunderstanding and noncompliance that have confounded interpretation
of the prior evidence, and provides new and stronger support for the claim that cooperation is
indeed intuitive.
The strong evidence we find for the social heuristics hypothesis has important implications
for the study of cooperation. First, our finding supporting intuitive cooperation implies that
cooperation in anonymous and non-repeated social dilemma experiments are in part due to
weak reciprocators who decide intuitively, and who may have inflated previous measures of
strong reciprocity in studies that did not distinguish between the dual-processes. Nevertheless,
participants in our study contributed more than half of their endowment to the public good
even when deciding reflectively. It remains to be seen whether this is evidence of strong reci-
procity as is often argued or evidence of heuristics that are resistant to change. Second, our
findings are in line with the argument that dual cognitive processes play a significant role in
the relationship between learning and human cooperation [22–25, 34, 35, 38, 39]. In this
Table 1. Tobit regressions of contributions made (%) in Short instructions condition.
Model Predictor b SEa 95% CI p
R1 Time-limits (Pressure = 1, Delay = 0) 19.32 8.16 [3.25, 35.37] 0.02
R2 Time-limits (Pressure = 1, Delay = 0) 19.03 8.11 [3.06, 35.00] 0.02
Understanding (Correct = 1, Incorrect = 0) -3.98 8.41 [-20.53, 12.57] 0.64
R3 Understanding Incorrect (Pressure = 1, Delay = 0) 11.67 9.63 [-7.28, 30.63] 0.23
Understanding Correct (Pressure = 1, Delay = 0) 28.97 13.77 [1.88, 56.06] 0.04
Regressions control for age and gender.
a Denotes robust standard errors.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190560.t001
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relationship, the role of culture in general and social learning in particular remain understud-
ied. The social heuristics hypothesis predicts that people from backgrounds with higher fre-
quencies of mutually beneficial social interactions would exhibit stronger intuitive
cooperation. Given our findings, a more stringent test of the social heuristics hypothesis could
be achieved by investigating predictions of intercultural differences in intuitive cooperation
[33, 34]. Finally, the phenomenon of intuitive cooperation suggests new avenues for policy-
making. As evidenced by growing global common resource problems such as climate change
and antimicrobial resistance, strong reciprocity in the relevant populations may not be suffi-
cient to achieve the levels of cooperation necessary for their resolution. At the same time,
cooperative experiences in the lab have been shown to have positive spill-over effects in social
dilemmas [35], and intuitive cooperation has been shown to be present in everyday interac-
tions [49]. Hence, policy goals may be fostered by exposing citizens to mutually beneficial local
cooperative experiences in order to harness intuitive cooperation spill-overs in the context of
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